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Abstract Ever since the food price crisis of 2007/8, con-
cerns about global food supply interruptions have
mounted. However, while exports from Brazil, the world’s
leading soy exporter, are currently under threat, this is not
due to geopolitical concerns, but due to resource misman-
agement. As a consequence, the country with the most
water availability per person is mired in an enduring water
crisis, impacting on its major water transport routes.
Brazil’s development model is based on an oligopolistic
public-private, primary-sector conglomerate, fueled by
the federal investment bank, BNDES. This article argues
that Brazil has embarked on an unsustainable model of devel-
opment and is exporting that model as part of its ‘South-South
Cooperation’ (SSC) drive. Like the other BRICS, Brazil is
using SSC to present itself as non-ideological and anti-
imperialist but, in fact, uses the cooperation strategy for
diplomatic and self-interested economic purposes. The
Middle East is specifically targeted as a region with ‘com-
plementary’ interests: rich in fossil fuels, poor in land and
water and plenty of petrodollars to buy food security. The
current water crisis shows limits to this complementarity,
in the process undermining the assumption that ‘virtual-
water exports’ promoted by competitive specialization are
salutary to the global water balance.
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Introduction
Global agro trade is expanding, and Brazil is benefiting. The
upsurge in global soya exports from the ‘soya republic’ of
South America’s Southern Cone is booming—at the cost of
US and Canadian soy trade1—now making Brazil the world’s
biggest soya exporter. Brazil’s seemingly limitless resource
wealth has incited an export drive to supply food and fodder
to resource-poor countries such as the Gulf states (soy exports
to the region were at a record level in 2014),2 and the country
is expanding its efforts into the African subcontinent under the
heading of South-South cooperation in order to repeat its ap-
parent success. This globalising tendency has been referred to
as the globalisation of virtual water neo-liberalism (Boelens
and Vos 2012).
More trade, however, alsomeans greater dependency. Price
spikes and land grabs have created an added sense of instabil-
ity and exploration of the consequences of interrupted global
supply chains, in which political shock scenarios play a prom-
inent role (e.g., PBL 2011 [the Dutch Environmental Planning
Agency]. How realistic are geopolitical fears of global supply
interruption, such as a Brazilian export ban impacting on the
Middle East?
1 ‘South America’s Southern Cone, where soy is the Bthe monoculture
‘starlet’ of the agro-export model^, produces 57 percent of global soy-
bean exports’ (Oliveira and Schneider 2014)
2 Alexandre Rocha, Brazil runs a US$ 2 billion surplus in trade with
Arabs. Brazil-Arab News Agency. 14 January 2015. www2.anba.com.
br/noticia/21866479/global-trade/brazil-runs-us-2-billion-surplus-in-
trade-with-arabs/
Saudi Arabia raising soybean and corn imports from Brazil. Arab
News 8 March 2015. http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia-raising-
soybean-and-corn-imports-brazil
Online: http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia-raising-soybean-
and-corn-imports-brazil; See also McGinley 2012
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This article will argue that Brazil’s soy exports are indeed
under stress, but not for geopolitical reasons. Brazil proves to
be a bewildering case of a ‘resource curse’ economy shooting
itself in the foot by failing to address some root causes.
Otherwise, how does a supposedly resource rich country still
manage to be in a water crisis?
A different picture is presented in this article. After intro-
ducing geopolitical security concerns related to the global
agri-food system, it examines South-South cooperation in
the light of Brazil’s geopolitical strategies. It then relates
current-day food politics with the Green Revolution 2.0 now
taking place and the post-2008 obsession with the water-
energy-food (WEF) nexus, which suggests the substitution
of water-for-energy with water-for-food bring joint security
benefits.3 This is predicated on the continued transfer of vir-
tual water from water-rich to water-poor regions,
presupposing an unlimited supply and requiring a political
rationality not ostensibly in evidence in Brazil.
The security pitfalls of global interdependence
Tony Allan’s virtual water thesis (Allan 2001) sees green
(root-zone) water from water-rich temperate countries
exported to the water-poor semi-arid regions, notably the
Middle East, as a silent global redistribution mechanism
through the global market and food aid. This has fostered
temperate-zone countries to seek markets abroad, as the
domestic market is too small. Moreover, in the case of
Brazil, technological breakthroughs also enabled tropical
zone production to expand and for the country to become
the first tropical food giant after a top-five of temperate-zone
producers (United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina and
the European Union).
The idea is that global agricultural trade evens out the
uneven global distribution in water endowments and in so
doing prevents water resource conflict with minimum fuss
(Allan 2001). In the past decades, the World Bank and
FAO have recommended the Middle East to step up its
food imports in light of its poor water and arable land
endowment (Harrigan 2014).
Relying on trade interdependence however proved prob-
lematic when global food prices exploded in 2007–2008.
The 2007/8 food price spike has led to concerns about security
implications of shocks in the agrifood trade, a possible repe-
tition of the early 1970s, when the prices of rice, wheat, maize,
and soy beans also went through the roof after geopolitical
upheavals in response to the first oil shock, among other
factors. The price rise and subsequent lack of local access
resulted in food riots in more than 20 countries (Jafri 2008),
leading several analysts to relate the so-called Arab Spring to
continued food insecurity (HCSS 2013; Harrigan 2014). In an
uncertain context, resource nationalism or conflict can cause
shocks to trade, hurting imports and/or exports. In such cases,
the response time of a heavily import-dependent economy
may vary, depending on its adaptive resilience (HCSS 2013).
Food importers started to worry about global supply chain
interruptions (HCSS 2013; PBL 2011; Bleischwitz et al. 2012;
Bindraban et al. 2009). This is important for resource-poor,
agro-importing countries. While the causal link between food
scarcity and revolution is unclear, the availability, affordability
and accessibility of nourishing food is important to the implic-
it social contract in authoritarian–paternalistic systems in the
Middle East. Most Middle East states are still highly food-
secure in terms of calories; yet this security is under pressure
(Woertz 2011, 2013) and even more so with currently volatile
oil prices, which affect their ability to pay for food imports.
The region is therefore vulnerable to sudden interruptions in
the supply chain. Reduction of water use and introduction of
greenhouses cannot eliminate this risk.
Apart from export restrictions, HCSS (2013) also see ver-
tical concentration of the food industry as a political risk,
increasing the effective control of the sector and in so doing
the potential for sharp changes in strategy. This seems a
realistic assessment at a time in which state capitalism, while
never really absent from the scene, has become much more
prominent with the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa) on the global scene.
The year 2008 saw export restrictions from Russia, Argen-
tina and Vietnam (see also Burger et al. 2010a, b). Brazil
asserted its sovereignty by seeking to restrict foreign land
ownership. Meanwhile, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
was stepped up through investor companies more often than
not (partially or wholly) state-owned or controlled. In 2012 the
BRICS even explicitly stressed the pivotal economic role of
State-Owned Companies (SOCs).
Having amassed an apparent surfeit of foreign reserves and
looking for investment opportunities, the agricultural drive is
also a strong impetus for Brazil to look East across the Atlan-
tic. Successful overseas agricultural export drives make do-
mestic exploitation ventures step up a gear. These are run by
companies that are more often than not under the tutelage of
the state.4 The question is what kind of development this aids:
a Rostowian transition/‘take-off’ or a (re)prioritization of
economies? The question is addressed in the following
3 Some would add phosphorus and rare earths to the mix, arriving at a
resource nexus which ‘originates in the interconnections between differ-
ent resources, in other words, the requirement that one (or more) resource
is used as an input to produce another resource’ (PBL 2011).
4 In Angola, for example, Dos Santos has been President for 33 year, and
has had a long-term relations with Btazoloam TNC Odebrecht. Brazilian
companies present in Africa, especially in Angola are :- Odebrecht con-
struction, OAS, Camargo Correa, and Andrade Gutierrez.
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discussion in the context of the rise of the BRICS economies
as ‘middle global powers’ and South-South cooperation.
The new middle powers: reinventing state capitalism
in a multipolar age
Since 1989, not only global East andWest, but also North and
South demarcations have become ever more blurred. Regional
powers now seek global reach and have leadership (Sadik
2013) whether it is the BRICS in agriculture and mining or
the Arab Gulf states in energy. However contradictory, Sadik
argues, they are all ‘occupying prominent positions in the
global supply chain’ and production networks, and have all
built up enormous reserves, which flow to financial centres.
An example is what Hanieh (2011) has dubbed the Khaliji
(‘Gulf’) capital of the Arab Gulf states, who are not only
key players in fossil fuel production but also financial movers
and shakers from their petrodollar surpluses and increasingly
through Sovereign Wealth Funds and private equity firms as
well as wielding geopolitical influence outside their orbits.
In so doing, they challenge global arrangements that
are taken for granted. Yet, counterhegemonic as the ascent
of the BRICS may look, they seem not so much bent on
toppling the global hegemon, as on transforming the in-
ternational regime—the ‘international trade/finance archi-
tecture’ and structures shaping what may be called the
governance of globalisation. This state-centric term is
chosen in preference to the liberal-institutional fixation
on global governance—as the latter would threaten state
sovereignty (Burger et al. 2010a, b)5. Boundaries and sov-
ereignty are still very much in evidence, all the more so
since the food price explosion of 2007/8.
The rise of the middle powers, regional hegemons and
global contenders, is an underappreciated corollary to tales
of relentless globalisation. The new regional hegemons need
to control their hinterland, but may hardly enjoy any trust by
or legitimacy from their neighbours, and even run into land
conflicts. For example, Brazil needs to deal with scuffles be-
tween Brazilian settlers in Paraguay (brasiguaios) and state-
to-state conflicts over energy with Bolivia. On the plus side,
economic and political success is a strong attractor, a source of
soft power in its own right (Nye 1990). Brazil takes the lead in
trade bloc (Mercosur), infrastructural integration and
transboundary projects such as the Rio Madeira canal
(hidrovia) to Peru facilitating soy exports there.
The new powers do not have a strong ideological message,
but are content to work through existing institutions, often by
reinforcing power structures (Carmody 2011). There is merit
in the observation that without neoliberal policies forcing the
door open in the past, many current investors would not have
been so successful. Yet Harvey (2009) has argued that those
which survived best have resisted further open doors. Brazil
and China profess wariness of neo-liberalism and promote
maybe not so much an alternative to, but a ‘rebalancing’ of
imposed Washington Consensus reforms.
But unlike radical and liberal accounts, the state did not
bounce back in this new arena, in favour of an unfettered
market, in which boundaries no longer matter. Instead, activist
development states assert their sovereignty and agency do-
mestically and internationally. Even the Economist has been
referring to the rise of ‘state monopoly capitalism’ (Lassance
2012; Kuntz 2014). The world order is now decidedly looking
less liberal-internationalist than was predicted after the fall of
the BerlinWall a quarter century ago (Gray 2014). The activist
state remains alive and kicking.
South-South cooperation
In the past decade or so, the above-mentioned disparate mul-
tilateralism assumed an attractive package in South-South co-
operation, an attractor deemed so important that the UN has
dedicated a day to it (12 September).
While Russia defies Europe in Ukraine and Syria and
Chinese keep sabre-rattling on the Daikyu/Senkaku
islands, generally the BRICS have carved out their global
position through exercising soft power, rather than openly
challenging the United States and its echoes of the Truman
Doctrine. If with different vernacular, all BRICS voice an
explicitly anti-neoliberal rhetoric, promoting a non-
colonial development model reminiscent of the Non-
Aligned Movement of the 1950s and the New International
Economic Order of the 1970s (Sommerville et al. 2014)
though clearly the international financial and economic
architecture of the day was more propitious under the
Bretton Woods system. This history resonates in Brazil’s
campaign for global inclusion and distributive justice and
political and economic emancipation from the early 21st
century. Brazil’s dominance in its South-South cooperation
is smaller, not targeting peasants, leaving implementation
to African partners, and practising non-interference in do-
mestic issues, not critical of domestic inequalities, only of
global inequalities. As such, Cesarino (2012) claims
present-day Brazil displays a refreshing restraint from la-
belling the Other as backward, underdeveloped, different.
The BRICS likewise seem deeply disinterested in
America’s wars in the Middle East, and Brazil’s diplomatic
forays into the Middle East are greatly helped by not ostenta-
tiously being about fossil fuels or national-security issues.
Brazil is considered to be very resource-rich and has success-
fully transformed its energy economy, reducing dependency
5 Governance is understood here as: who makes decisions and how they
are made (Bakker 2007)
South-South cooperation: Brazilian soy diplomacy looking East? 1177
on fossils by converting to hydropower and biofuels. Thus,
access to resources is not the primary driver.
Rather, Brazil claims that it merely seeks to copy its do-
mestic successes abroad and does so by emphasising transfer-
ability of achievements, despite well-known warnings against
copy-paste. An example is Brazil’s social security (safety-net)
system, Bolsa Familia (Conditional Cash) now supported by
the World Bank and Britain’s DFID. Following a planning-
dominated history, Brazil, like many other countries liberal-
ized, rescaled and decentralised its agricultural production in
1997. Yet under the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores, Workers’
Party)-led coalition government, Brazil displays many of the
trappings of a neo-Fordist development state, if in a decidedly
different global constellation, and has impressively managed
to reduce its own poverty. The expectation is that it will be-
have accordingly in its development projects abroad. Brazil
prefers to talk of ‘horizontality, exchanging knowledge and
sharing experiences, cooperation’, a discourse predicated on
the idea that ‘African countries have much to learn from
Brazil’s store of successful experiences in sectors such as
tropical agriculture’ (Cesarino 2012).
The prevailing discourse of South-South cooperation has
sparked debates about its merits. Various authors (Table 1)
have identified a divergence in the assessment of the nature
of South-South cooperation, whose discourse promotes ‘hor-
izontal’ South-South cooperation as an alternative to ‘vertical’
North–south development. Does this bring equal partner-
ship, symmetric relations built on ‘soft power’ (Amanor
2013) or asymmetry and domination—‘involvement in
the international market in a subordinate position that
Bserves the globalisation^ of transnational capitalism’
(Prashad 2013)? A neo-dependencia6 school on the other
hand claims BRICS practices are not that different from
their predecessors, and wonders how much ‘cooperation’
there is in South-South cooperation. In the middle is a
‘realist’ (Realpolitik) approach that sees neither good nor
evil in state behaviour (See Table 1). Employing different
labels, each publication listed in Table 1 comes up with a
variety of what I grouped as an ‘optimist-idealist’, a ‘Realist’
and a ‘negative-catastrophist’ interpretation of South-South
cooperation.
This last tradition of explaining underdevelopment,
dependencia, was developed by Latin American structural
economists such as Andre Gunder Frank and Raúl Prebisch
at CEPAL/ECLA. Dependencia evolved into World-systems
theory, which helps us understand global relations as econom-
ic exploitation, whether of people or resources (Wallerstein
1974). The neo-Marxian world-systems tradition sees foreign
direct investment as neo-colonial competition between impe-
rialist powers extracting resources for their reproduction.
World-systems analysts identify a hierarchically ordered
(and multi-level) global core, semi-peripheral and peripheral
groupings. The system’s economic core extracts resources
from the periphery, often aided by a venal’comprador bour-
geoisie’ in the periphery, selling out natural resources to
foreign investors for private gain. Middle powers
(subimperialists) act as transmission belts and sources of
innovation between core and periphery.
The Brazilian social scientist Ruy Marini (1972)
claimed Brazil’s dictatorship enabled it to become a
subimperialist, its state capitalism founded on monopoly
industries notably in construction, co-opting national and
international capital, notably servicing American interests.
Marini argued that local capitalism in Brazil was strong
enough to maintain a relationship of cooperative
competition with the global hegemon. Following in his
footsteps, Zibechi (2014) sees Brazil under the leadership
of the Workers’ Party (PT) loosening ties with the US and
embracing South-South Alliances while still subservient to
international capital. Zibechi argues that an intersectorial
coalition of unionists, bureaucrats and large company
owners controls the state, industry and key social spheres
with the lineage of Portuguese colonial structures.
The view that ‘Southern’ elites largely follow ‘core’ ideas
and interests has remained influential. We do not fully need to
go with this view of the Brazilian state as a handmaiden of
‘Northern’ interests to see ample evidence of public-private
collusion. The next section goes into this constellation
governing the food sector.
‘Collaborative capitalism’?
‘Neoliberalism’ may be a misnomer for the hegemonic trend
in this arena; instead we may well find ourselves in an era of
‘collaborative capitalism’ (Greider 1997). Developments in
the food sector both reaffirm and contradict a supposed neo-
liberal order (McMichael 2009).
Shocks and crises are often held to herald a new era, but
upon closer scrutiny, they only accelerate emerging patterns
(Kelman 2006). Since the food price explosion of 2007/2008,
resource mercantilism has gained strength (McMichael 2009;
Koning and Mol 2009). The food price rise dramatically ac-
celerated the pace of protectionism at home and resource im-
perialism abroad.
It may be recalled that at the outset of this contribution,
vertical integration was identified as a security risk. In the
past decade, Latin America has seen a strong ‘downstream
6 Dependency or dependencia theory arose in the 1970s in contradistinc-
tion to modernisation theory, and claims that ‘resources flow from a
Bperiphery^ of poor and underdeveloped states to a Bcore^ of wealthy
states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central
contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and
rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the Bworld
system.^’ (Wikipedia). Key figures are Andre Gunder Frank and Osvaldo
Sunkel.
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concentration’ in the food chain coupled with economic
state activism. ‘Much of South-South cooperation… has
been provided by state institutions and actors, and in Brazil
this prevalence is nearly absolute’ (Cesarino 2012). In fair-
ness, not all major players in BRICS are state-controlled,
and transnational companies (TNCs) continue to dominate
the global market. Here too however, liberal doctrine falls
f la t as t ransact ions become based on industr ial
relationships rather than on open markets—a phenomenon
the journalist William Greider has aptly labelled ‘cooper-
ative capitalism’—modalities may change, but structural
inequalities are perpetuated (Greider 1997).
While Brazil has manifested itself as a classical develop-
ment state, it has revealed itself as an ambidextrous state (Peck
2010): Bmarket-tolerant yet state-centric^. In most sectors
oligopoly is now a reality. Brazilian exports are dominated
by Public-Private Partnerships with nationals and transna-
tionals, such as Ceval in soy. Although homegrown
agrobusinesses are growing rapidly, Brazil continues to be
dominated by vertically integrating Transnational
(agro-)Companies (TNCs)—the ‘ABCD’ (ADM, Bunge,
Cargill, Dreyfuss) (Oliveira 2015). The four giants have a
quasi-monopoly on soybean oil extraction, as well as a
major stake in almost all the value chain, from seeds and
pesticides to harbours and storage, and now Cargill is re-
portedly building a river transport fleet.7 These big guns
have access to finance when cash is constrained and bring
state-of-the-art technology while Brazil supplies the land,
its resources, and labour.
Given Brazil’s reliance on biofuels to substitute for
imported fossil fuels (sugarcane-based ethanol but also soy-
based biodiesel) it merits mentioning that Brazil’s energy sec-
tor is dominated by only six companies and a technocratic
leadership, the economy as a whole by some 20 (Forbes
2014), and a concentration of money benefits of these 20 to
invest billions in Brazil and outside Brazil, with six big cor-
porations. A landmark in the public-private entanglement is
the so-called ‘PAC’ or Plano de Accelaração de Crecimento
(Growth Acceleration Plan) in which the big six partners in
development of Brazil, form ‘Strange cathedrals’ (Campos
2014) such as mega-hydrodams and stadiums and infrastruc-
ture for the World Cup and the Olympics to social housing
(the Minha Casa, Minha Vida programme).
The six, including Petrobras (energy), Vale do Rio Doce
in mining (the second largest mining company in the
world), and Odebrecht in engineering and construction,
operate ‘generally in tune with government foreign policy,
as their own raison d’être is in great part due to their um-
bilical connection to the state that gives coverage to their
monopolistic/oligopolistic situation’ (Vieira 2011). This
investment is heavily backed by Brazil’s national invest-
ment bank, BNDES (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento
Economico e Social) investing both in Brazil’s backyard
(Bolivia, Ecuador, etc.) as well as in Africa and backing
up diplomatic overtures to the Middle East.
As so often happens in bullish claims of ‘win-win situa-
tions’ there tend to be silent losers in the background too, often
regarded by economists as ‘externalities’. The externalities of
cooperation in the present context are not trivial and this is the
burden of the final section of this article.
Geopolitics of Brazil-Middle East rapprochement
The above has described BRICS not only as increasingly im-
portant trade partners supplying food needs in the Middle
East, but also newly emerging donors, and Brazil has offered
African development partner countries soft-power ‘goodies’
such as debt cancellation, embassies and scholarships. Yet
despite the apparent benevolence, food can be a weapon,
and Brazil’s ventures abroad are not exclusively economic in
7 Cargill builds first waterway shipment fleet in Brazil.Wilson & Sons. 12
February 2015. Online: Acceleracao http://www.wilsonsons.com.br/
agencia/en/press/news/cargill-builds-first-waterway-shipment-fleet-
brazil
Table 1 Comparison of classifications of discourses on South-South Cooperation
Author(s) Optimist-idealist discourse Realist discourse Pessimist-catastrophist discourse
Vieira (2011) International solidarity,
anti-colonialism and
decrease of dependence







as one instrument to
defend development
interests on a global scale
‘Subimperialism’, seeks sphere of
influence within existing hegemony
Agbo (2008) Mutual benefits, countries





imperialism for their own
sake (‘Protoimperialism’)
Rising Southern economies as agents of
northern economies, transmission belts
between core and periphery (Subimperialism)
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nature. Sebastian and Warner (2014) have claimed that access
to land, water or markets are unlikely to be the only consider-
ation of the surging Foreign Direct Investment. Like everyone
else, the BRICS seem to pursue geopolitical goals, such as
spheres of influence. As noted, Brazil’s Africa policy seeks
to garner support for a seat at the United Nations Security
Council, of which it has been a very long non-permanent
member, by presenting itself as a rising Southern country,
fundamentally different (i.e., neutral) in outlook from the
industrialised North.
Latin America’s total refocus on the primary sector (ag-
riculture and mining) (re-primarization, Gudynas 2009)
paradoxically only reinforces this trend. In this process,
agricultural modernization plays a major part. Brazil has
taken the lead in a global initiative against hunger, together
with the World Food Programme (WFP), a move supported
by France and others (Gratius 2007).
This agrodiplomatic activism (Juma 2011) is not a new
phenomenon for Brazil. In the early 1970s, the prices of rice,
wheat, maize, and soybeans skyrocketed. While the ruling
dictatorship saw Brazilian overtures to Africa as tantamount
to communism at the time, the oil crisis saw energy-hungry
Brazil turn pro-Arab, including arms supplies (Global Voices
2012). Export of Brazilian defence technology took off in
1976 and until the late 1980s the Middle East was Brazil’s
biggest weapons market (Perlo-Freeman 2004; Inbar and
Zilberfarb 1998).
Forty-plus years hence, more than 50 % of Brazil’s ex-
ports are not for the global North. Brazil’s manifestation in
the Middle East and elsewhere serves not only economic
but clear political goals on both sides (Chatham House
n.d.). Many Middle East states are ‘rentier states’ (Beblawi
and Luciani 2012), buying legitimacy by redistributing
wealth from external rents like oil sales and Suez Canal
fees to the population. Ajl (2014) claims ‘food security is
a discourse which is mobilized in the [MENA] region and
elsewhere for ends having little to do with securing food:
namely, the distribution of state rents to social elites in
ways which would otherwise be difficult to publicly
justify’(Ajl 2014). For this, food should be plentifully
available. Brazil and Sub-Sahara are considered areas in
which land and water potential is plentiful. Let’s go into
the strategic history of this and subsequently arrive at
the current nexus linking food, development and
security.
The green revolutions
Duffield (2001) and others have long pointed at the
development-security connection, in which economic de-
velopment is subservient to geopolitical security inter-
ests—development for security. This was most visible in
the post-World War II period, in which the spread of the
Green Revolution served Cold War interests. Currently, it
connects ‘development for the hungry and security for the
(privileged) rest of us’ in one tidy package. This promoted
the investment and spread of the Green Revolution, and in
Brazil its own Bsecond Green Revolution^’ (Sommerville
et al. 2014). The US envisaged a hub-and-spokes system of
regional hegemons (policemen) and their wards from the
1970s Nixon Doctrine, which boiled down to delegating
policing to cronies.8
When compared to other flatter South American states
such as Argentina, Brazil has a challenging topography.
While Brazil in recent decades has aggressively sought
to expand the agricultural frontier through improving nav-
igation channels, transport infrastructure is not Brazil’s
strongest suit. Yet the country has masterminded its own
Green Revolution to work an agricultural miracle, first
over the cerrado (savannah). The emblematic soy state is
Mato Grosso, now the biggest producer in the world, next
come Goias, Mato Grosso do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul and
Paraná. The ‘soy frontier’ has moved from the South to the
Centre-West of Brazil, accelerating the clearing of the
cerrado (though not as much as for livestock); then in-
creasingly spreading to the tropical Amazon rain forest,
to put the pressure on deforestation there (Willaarts et al.
2011). Forest is often first cleared for cattle ranching, be-
fore being turned over to arable farming when the land is
too exhausted (Domingues and Bermann 2012). A strong
belief in efficiencies of scale sidelined and displaced
‘small-scale’ peasant operations.9 While low on fertiliser
and rarely irrigated, herbicide use in Brazilian soy produc-
tion is high (Fearnside 2001). As soy production is mainly
export-oriented (73 % in 2008), it means net virtual water
export for food export, water allocations rising 23 % be-
tween 2002 and 2008 (Willaarts et al. 2011). Finally,
Fearnside (2001) argues soybean production has had
knock-on effects, legitimising the construction of water-
ways, road and rail infrastructure, which in turn attracts
mining and logging interests into the soy regions, includ-
ing the Amazon.
A key figure in this drive was Blairo Maggi, CEO of the
world’s biggest soya company, André Maggi Group
(Amaggi). When governor of Mato Grosso (2003–2010)
and on Forbes’ list of most influential people in the world,
Maggi sought to double soy production. Amaggi has now
turned its gaze onto the entire value chain, recently
obtaining Rs 27 million (USD 6.5 million) in financial
8 In the domain of current-day agrifood politics, this connection may
invite a food mission creep. Economic development can be framed as
anti-terrorism, even more so Post 9/11 (Prashad 2013).
9 Although ‘small-scale’ is a relative term. A 300 ha operation counts as
‘small’ in Brazil, while it would rate as ‘enormous’ in the Netherlands, the
author’s present country of residence.
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support from Brazil’s federal investment bank BNDES for
the construction of grain silos to store soya and corn in the
cerrado region.10 International funders likewise accelerat-
ed the expansion of soya, Bunge being one of the biggest
promoters of rural investment (Otta 2014).
Given that soy was only a staple of Asian diets, and that
Japanese migrants into Brazil have grown soy for over a cen-
tury, the inexorable rise of soy in Brazil was not immediately
obvious: ‘Brazilian commercial farmers only began planting
soybeans in any extensive manner after the 1940s as a cover
crop and green manure to restore nitrogen to soils degraded by
wheat production^ (…) which was then Bincorporated into the
vegetable oil industry, with livestock feed as the constructed
co-market. Only after soy became a consolidated industrial
input for the vegetable oil and livestock feed markets, have
soybean-processing companies in Brazil begun to promote its
use as a human food, a food processing additive, and
biodiesel^ (Oliveira and Schneider 2014). Since the 1970s,
however, Brazil has exploited its land and water riches domes-
tically to part-convert its economy from fossil fuels to
biofuels.
After the American soy-bean embargo and shortfall of
Peruvian fish meal in the early 1970s, Japanese investors
purchased land in Brazil for soy-bean production.
Programmes such as Prodecer (Program of Brazilian and
Japanese Cooperation for the Agricultural Development of
the Brazilian Cerrado) promoted land concentration and
foreign direct investment in Brazil (Clements and
Fernandes 2012). While soybeans were customarily grown
in the moderate climate zone, the Second Green Revolu-
tion enabled Brazil to colonise the tropical zones too. In so
doing Brazil has not only become a major agro-food ex-
porter, but also producer of biofuels, especially ethanol
(import substitution)—sugarcane is grown traditionally in
Sao Paulo but now also in the Northeast and Amazon
(Stratfor 2012).
The Green Revolution in Brazil was Japan-assisted, and
Japan has remained a big investor in Brazil; for example in
2007 Japan’s Mitsui bought 100,000 ha in Brazil, while Brazil
is partnering with Japanese in the enormous Prosavana project
in Mozambique, spanning an area of 14 million ha of great
biodiversity. This was chosen for its similar agro-ecology and
climate to that of the Brazilian Cerrado and seeks to ‘repli-
cate’ the experience of agricultural development there. The
joint Nacala Fund, called after the central corridor in the pro-
ject, was to furnish USD 2 billion to soybean businesses
(Clements and Fernandes 2012). Prosavana, which runs from
2011 to 2016, is seen by critics as Brazilian land grab abroad
(Avelhan 2013). An area the size of Switzerland and Austria
combined cannot only consist of ‘abandoned areas’ and in-
deed it is the most densely populated area in Mozambique
(http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/24367). Infrastructure in
the project area, however, proved substandard, and hardly
any Brazilian farmer took the opportunity to settle, causing a
redrafting of the Master Plan (Fairhead et al. 2012).
The security-development nexus has found a new apolitical
expression in the water-energy-food resource nexus, talk of
which is especially prominent for the Middle East. The nexus
explicitly puts resource interdependence in the security do-
main (Allouche et al. 2014) while at the same time holding
out the promise of a resolution due to non-political benefit-
sharing between interdependent states. The reallocation of
‘virtual water’ from resource-rich to resource-poor countries,
as key input for food and hydropower, would reduce the pinch
of resource scarcity. The next Section goes into the realism of
that assumption.
Flush with cash, flush with resources? The downside
of the Brazilian resource grab
The intensive exploitation of one’s own resources11 facilitates
a kind of social peace (Swyngedouw 2007 on Spain, Warner
2012 on Turkey) by enlarging the ‘cake’ and providing em-
ployment. A focus on the primary sector induced by a ‘re-
source curse’ however has taken both its environmental and
social toll as Brazil continues to draw down its resources at
home and land grabs uproot thousands.
Sugarcane and soy are so-called flex crops: crops that can
be used for food, feed, fuel or industrial materials. Grabbing
land means direct access to food and energy, and may even be
subsidised as ‘climate investment’.
Currently the so-called Water-food-energy-climate Nexus
is all the rage, with a view to promoting a Green Economy
(Hoff et al. 2011; Allouche et al. 2014). The Nexus recasts
environmental problems as the result of market failures rather
than specific outcomes of marketisation (Corson et al. 2013).
Environmental services, provided by water, benefit food and
energy production and may allow benefit-sharing and mutual
gains. Critics, however, have noted the green economy is tan-
tamount to accumulation under a green banner. Political ecol-
ogists studying Becological distribution conflicts^ such as
Guha and Martínez-Alier (1997: 31) and Adams (2004) have
called attention to this ‘ecological land grab’ or ‘green grab’:
direct foreign investment in mostly agricultural land for
biofuels, climate buffers and green parks. Whether due to




11 An example of Brazilian ‘internal colonization’ facilitated by Dutch
banks. The ‘Plantar Project’ inMinas Gerais, involving eucalyptus mono-
culture, financed by Dutch Rabo Bank, facilitates Green financing at
lower interest rates and for income from the sale of CO2 reduction. Plantar
sells these reductions to the PCF, of which the Rabo bank is a shareholder.
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sequestered for food or fuel, both serve to expel locals, often
poor and/or indigenous groups and traditional black commu-
nities (quilombas). Hunters become poachers, squatters be-
come bandits in a discourse seeking to preserve land for con-
servation. From this critical Marxist perspective the current
fervour for ‘land grabbing’ may be seen as a new form of
Primitive Accumulation with a benign, green face.
As noted, Brazil is flush with cash looking for invest-
ment. The country’s foreign currency holdings jumped
from USD50 billion to USD374 billion between 2006
and 2013 (Cascione 2013), though that figure may be in-
flated by the Central Bank’s currency swaps, see Wheatley
2014: http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/01/15/brazil-
net-debtor-to-the-world/). While this serves as a first line
of defence against crisis, Corson et al. (2013) argue that
‘[as] over-accumulated capital seeks new investment op-
portunities, it discovers environmental protection as a
new direct and speculative opportunity for investment
through the production of mechanisms like carbon trading
and wildlife derivatives’.
Brazil is commonly presented as having plenty of land
and water to spare: according to the United Nations World
Water Assessment Report of 2009,12 Brazil has the highest
availability of renewable water per person in the world
(some 43,028m3/capita/year). This water wealth has
legitimised massive investment in hydropower plants, such
as Belo Monte in the Amazon region. Brazil’s ‘resource
curse’ leads the country to invest massively in lusophone
Africa to copy its agricultural achievements at home.
Many of the biggest and most aggressive foreign state in-
vestors are those facing real and potential arable land and
water shortages at home: China, India, South Africa, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, South Korea and
Japan. Brazil takes a twin role of investor and investee; the
country remains one of the world’s biggest targets for invest-
ment. ‘More than half of the foreign capital invested in land in
Brazil comes from just seven countries: Portugal, Japan, Italy,
Lebanon, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands’ (Sauer and
Leite 2012). In 2006, however, after a successful Greenpeace
campaign (Greenpeace 2006), soy producers, authorities and
concerned organizations negotiated a moratorium in which
soy would not be grown any longer on deforested land in
the Amazon. In 2007, moreover, President Lula considered
limiting foreign land grabs in which 50 % or more of the
shareholdings were controlled by foreigners and set a maxi-
mum of one quarter foreign ownership of municipal areas.
This plan was resisted by the opposition, preferring to give
free rein to national companies even if they were foreign-
owned. ‘The world is counting on Brazil to feed it!’ Brazil
continues to provide entrance—if with some limits13—to
massive foreign direct investment in the primary sector. Par-
ticularly, the states of Mato Grosso, Goiás, São Paulo,
Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sul and Bahia serve as the
agricultural frontier, and as such the core ‘land grabbing
corridor’ in Brazil’ (Clements and Fernandes 2012).
However, the recipient state may not necessarily be bet-
ter off in terms of resources than the investor. In the new
virtual water geopolitics, water-poor countries not only in-
vest in resource-rich countries, but also in countries with
resource problems of their own. Saudi Arabia for example
has invested in parched Egypt—the Toshka scheme in the
desert (Warner 2013), while the Middle East is eyeing
Brazil’s land and water wealth.
In 2014–2015, Brazil experienced the worst drought in
60 years, and the impact of drought stress on domestic agri-
culture and industry is already being felt. While the intensity
of the drought is unusual, it may have been self-inflicted by
poor governance and water-guzzling production in ill-suited
conditions. Due to a combination of serious mismanagement
and some unusually dry seasons the country is seeing a serious
water crisis in 2014–2015. Unlike energy (including hydro-
power), water is not subject to national policy in Brazil, so that
there is no coordinated action on water management. The
water managers of the state of Sao Paulo for example, a key
agricultural producer, had no emergency planning whatsoever
(Leite 2014), while the state’s Governor Alckmin judged it
convenient to ignore then downplay the dwindling resources
until after the 2014 elections. By election time, however, al-
most 2000 Brazilian municipalities comprising over a fifth of
the country’s populace had declared a state of emergency over
drought (Rodrigues 2014).
At a deeper level the ingrained culture of wastefulness,
undervaluation of water resources and under-investment in
water infrastructure improvement has a long history, espe-
cially but not exclusively during the military dictatorship
(1964–1985) when ‘development state’ planners put a
higher priority on economic development at the expense
of growing environmental degradation and water scarcity
(Victor et al. 2015). In its thrust for agricultural space Brazil
has paid little attention to the fact that the Amazon river as
well as the Pantanal wetlands are fed by Cerrado tributaries.
The ‘century drought’may have tipped a system over the edge
that was already suffering from dismal governance and
exploitation. The level in Brazil`s hydroelectric dams has been
dropping dramatically, so that hard choices needed to be
made: whether to use surface water for energy or transport
for agricultural exports. As a result, the Tiete-Parana
waterway has been closed since May 2014, reducing soy
transport. The alternative, haulage by lorry, was marred by a
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Lerrer (2015) argues that Cerrado rivers had already been
sucked dry by soybean expansion before the crisis. Environ-
mentalists such as The Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife
Fund and Greenpeace saw the drought coming and formed the
Alliance for Water (Aliança pela Água) in 2014 (Martin
2014). The alarm was unlikely to be heeded by a growth-
focused government, whose new Science Minister, Rebelo,
has declared the environmental movement is Bnothing less,
in its geopolitical essence, than the bridgehead of
imperialism^ (Watts 2015) and whose Agriculture Minister
Katia Abreu unabashedly represents megafarms. Rather than
address these root causes, the government’s response to
drought in Brazil has been to plan more hydropower dams
(HEPP) in the Amazon to increase capacity (Carvalho
2012). This is in line with the nexus, which legitimises dams
as ‘green buffers’ for water, food and climate security, but in
fact, some claim, mainly serve nonsecurity goals, such as the
financialisation of investor assets (Ahlers et al. 2015).
Conclusion
This article has examined vulnerabilities and strategies in
the interdependent global food system. The threat of, say, a
Brazilian export ban for geopolitical reasons seems unlikely. It
is a scenario the EU's biggest soy importer, the Netherlands,
has contemplated in light of the 2007–2008 food upheavals
(Bindraban et al. 2009), and is certainly something import-
dependent countries such as the Gulf states worry about. The
Middle East counts on Brazil (and Sub-Saharan Africa) to
supply the food and minerals enabling its states to buy legit-
imacy without granting too much democracy. The current
drought, however, put paid to the idea that the two regions
are necessarily complementary in their resource abundance vs.
resource poverty.
The concentration of the Brazilian agro-industrial complex
would allow concerted action. There certainly is historic pre-
cedent of politically-induced volte-faces in food geopolitics
(including the US in the 1970s (Harrigan 2014). Brazil threat-
ening to embargo its exports would have a major impact, but
the state does not seemmotivated—to the contrary, it wants to
sell. The current shortfall of Brazil’s exports, then, is not due
to any calculation, but the bizarre outcome of mismanaging
plentiful resources and a politically motivated unwillingness
to do any contingency planning. While seeking an outlet for
its financial surpluses by investing heavily in African agricul-
tural ventures, Brazil has been squandering its resource abun-
dance at home, unintentionally causing potential interruptions
in the soy economy due to the drought and subsequent closure
of a key transport route. In so doing it has needlessly revived
the spectre of global supply chain disruptions.
While Brazil does not seem intent on playing ‘hard geopol-
itics’, South-South cooperation is not as ‘horizontal’ and
egalitarian as the word ‘cooperation’ might suggest. The
country’s ‘soft power’ aspirations on the global scene are but-
tressed by obvious domestic economic interests. Like the oth-
er BRICS, Brazil may Btalk anti-imperialist^ but wants a size-
able slice of the cake for itself (Bond 2013). And while the
new middle powers may sound refreshingly low on ideology
and paternalism, their moves are also depressingly low on
sustainability. In promoting South-South cooperation, Brazil
risks exporting a structurally exploitative model to other con-
tinents. Brazil’s cosy domestic and foreign public-private
‘concept of control’ has its hazards. The major companies
are also major campaign funders for Brazil’s PT-led govern-
ment, now in its fourth term. Current corruption cases against
giants such as Petrobras and Odebrecht hit the Brazilian oli-
gopolistic public-private complex hard, dampening bullish-
ness about South-South cooperation, while the drought crisis
has highlighted the deleterious effects of an exaggerated and
destructive focus on primary sector monocultures, in so doing
also shooting holes into the assumption that ‘virtual-water
exports’ based on competitive agricultural specialisation are
necessarily salutary outcomes of the water-energy-food nexus.
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